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JURISDICTION OVER OFFSHORE FISHERIES-
HOW FAR INTO THE HIGH SEAS
LUDWIK A. TECLAFF*
"Big Russ Fleet Sweeps Bottom Fish Grounds-Drives U.S. Fishermen
Back to Port." Headline, The Daily Astorian (Oregon), April 11, 1966.
"I can't get perch this year. I go to our normal spots for fishing and
Russian trawlers are there." Notarized deposition of an Oregon fishing-
vessel owner, May 7, 1966, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Mier-
chant Marine and Fisheries of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 65, at 162 (1966).
"Let not the fish Russia catches be us. Helpl" Telegram from a Con-
stituent to Senator Warren G. Magnuson, May 1966.
IT was not the first time, by any means, that Soviet and other foreign
trawlers had fished close to American shores, but the appearance of a
Soviet fishing fleet off the Oregon coast in the spring of 1966 precipitated
a crisis in United States fishery circles. Pressure was intensified to pass
legislation establishing an exclusive fishery zone beyond the territorial
sea of the United States. Both House and Senate subcommittees held hear-
ings toward the end of May, at which many witnesses testified to the
depletion of off-shore stocks of bottom fish on the Atlantic and the
Pacific coasts of the United States by large, well-equipped Soviet fleets,
quartering the fishing grounds with precision and thoroughness, and
reportedly using gear and methods forbidden to American fishermen for
reasons of conservation.' The State Department, prodded by American
commercial fishing interests, urgently requested talks with Soviet officials,
and these were held in Moscow in July, resulting in Soviet promises to
keep its vessels at least twelve miles offshore, a distance equivalent to the
U.S.S.R.'s own fishery jurisdiction; to redistribute its fleet so that smaller
American craft were not forced off their traditional fishing grounds; to
refrain from salmon fishing; and to permit American inspection of Soviet
vessels.' However, it was reported in the House of Representatives on
* Associate Professor of Law and Librarian, Fordham University School of Law.
1. Hearings on S. 2218 Before the Subcommittee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries of
the Senate Committee on Commerce, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 65 (1966); Hearings on HR.
9531 Before the Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation of the House Com-
mittee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
2. Department of State, Release No. 180, 55 State Dep't Bull. 273 (Aug. 3, 1966).
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October 3 that these promises had not been kept, and that first-hand
accounts had been received of Soviet vessels fishing within twelve miles of
the shore.3 Then on October 15 President Johnson signed into law a bill
establishing an exclusive, contiguous fishery zone nine miles beyond the
three-mile territorial sea of the United States.4
Not all American commercial fishermen favored the legislation. There
was vigorous opposition from tuna-boat owners, who range far from
United States shores and whose vessels have been seized by powers
claiming much more extensive fishery jurisdiction. For example, three
tuna clippers, the Sun Europa, Ronnie S., and Eastern Pacific, were seized
October 2-3, 1966, by the Peruvian navy some 20 to 30 miles off the coast
of Peru.' The extension of a twelve-mile fishery zone reflects, for the time
being at least, the predominance of local over distant fishing interests,
and with its passage the United States abandoned a position almost as old
as the nation itself-that in the waters seaward of the three-mile terri-
torial sea, freedom of fishing was extended to all countries alike as part of
the traditional freedom of the high seas.
The principle of freedom of the seas served the maritime nations of the
world well enough, as long as the main use of the oceans was as a highway
for commerce, but by the middle of the present century the conditions
that had fostered its establishment had changed so much that a re-exami-
nation of the regime of the seas could no longer be avoided. The challenge
came primarily from a greatly intensified exploitation of the living and
mineral resources of the sea.
Despite more than a half century of advances in fishery science, con-
troversy still rages on the question of whether the living resources of the
ocean are exhaustible or not. McDougal and Burke, for example, contend
that they are "difficult or impossible to deplete in a degree technologically
irreversible." 6 Christy and Scott, on the other hand, state that because
fishery resources vary so much in type, size, location, density of popula-
tion, and ease of capture, "no single species is inexhaustible nor is it free
from the possibility of depletion. The economic forces that dictate the
intensity of fishing effort are concentrated on single species or groups of
species, and it is here that competition induces conflict and international
tension."7
The validity of the second part of this statement can be tested against
any number of fishing disputes in history. The Oregon fisherman's 1966
3. 112 Cong. Rec. 24238 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1966).
4. 80 Stat. 908 (1966).
5. 112 Cong. Rec. 24238 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1966).
6. McDougal & Burke, The Public Order of the Oceans vii-viii (1962).
7. Christy & Scott, The Common Wealth in Ocean Fisheries 86 (1965).
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complaint that he and his colleagues could not fish for perch because
Russian trawlers had preempted their normal fishing spots is a 350-year-
old echo of James I's 1609 proclamation concerning the Anglo-Dutch
herring fishery, in which he referred to "the multitude of Strangers, which
do preoccupy those places"' formerly enjoyed by local fishermen.
Depletion, real or fancied, results in pressures to regulate fishing. Until
around the turn of the century, however, such regulation had consisted
chiefly in measures to reduce the incidence of disputes between fishermen,
as in the 1839 and unimplemented 1867 conventions concerning the
Channel fisheries9 and the 1882 Convention for Regulating the Police of
the North Sea Fisheries."0 By that time exploitation of certain species of
marine creatures, such as the fur seal, had become so intensified that their
extermination seemed imminent." It was no longer a matter of police
regulations to prevent the kind of international entanglements resulting
from A's trawl gear carrying away B's drift nets. Positive conservation
measures were needed.'
2
Thus the quest began for a formula of equitable apportionment of
fishery resources, which of necessity involved progressive restriction and
modification of free competition on the oceans. The first attempts were
by agreement between the handful of principal seafaring nations, pro-
viding for quotas of their catch of particular marine species and for other
measures of conservation. Among such agreements are the multilateral
convention of 1911 for the preservation and protection of the fur seals of
the North Pacific (Russia, Japan, Great Britain, and the United States) ; '
8. Quoted in Leonard, International Regulation of Fisheries 13 (1944).
9. Convention Between Great Britain and France, for Defining and Regulating the
Limits of the Exclusive Right of the Oyster and Other Fishery on the Coasts of Great
Britain and of France, 27 British and Foreign State Papers 983 (1839); Convention be-
tween Great Britain and France, Relative to Fisheries in the Seas between Great Britain
and France, 57 British.and Foreign State Papers 8 (1867).
10. Convention Between Great Britain, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, and the
Netherlands, for Regulating the Police of the North Sea Fisheries, 73 British and Foreign
State Papers 39 (1882).
11. See Letter From Secretary of State Bayard to American Ambassadors, Aug. 19,
1887, in Fur Seal Arbitration-Proceedings of the Tribunal of Arbitration, part II app,
at 168-69 (1895) ; Note From Secretary of State Root to the British, Russian and Japanese
Ambassadors, Jan. 21, 1909, in 1 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 792-93 (1940).
12. The study of fisheries was, by this time, becoming recognized as a science, and
various bodies such as the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (1902),
the International Commission for the Scientific Exploration of the Mediterranean Sea
(1914), and the North American Council on Fishery Investigations (1920) were created
for research into the problem. See Sea Fisheries: Their Investigation in the United Kingdom
1 (Graham ed. 1956); Johnston, International Law of Fisheries 91-92. (1965).
13. 37 Stat. 1542 (1911). See 1 Hackworth, op. cit. supra note 11, at 795 (1940). On
the history of the fur seal controversies and the Bering Sea Fur Seal Arbitration of 1893
see Leonard, op. cit. supra note 8, at 55-95.
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the conventions of 1923, 1930, 1937, and 1953 for the preservation of the
halibut fishery of the Northern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea (United
States and Canada);14 the Baltic Convention of 1929 (Denmark, Ger-
many, Poland, Danzig, and Sweden), which refers chiefly to plaice and
flounder;15 the convention of 1930 between Canada and the United States
concerning Fraser River salmon;" and the abortive 1937 convention con-
cerning cod, haddock, hake, and other species in the North Atlantic
(Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Iceland, the Irish Free State, the Nether-
lands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom).17
After World War II, such measures in themselves were inadequate to
cope with the changing situation. On the one hand, the world fish catch
was increasing by leaps and bounds. Between 1950 and 1960 it almost
doubled, from some 20 million metric tons to more than 39 million, and
by 1964 it stood at nearly 52 million metric tons. 18 This remarkable
growth was due in part to the entry of new participants, such as Peru, into
the ranks of major fishing powers, and partly to technological develop-
ments permitting fleets to range the oceans for months at a time, operating
with the most moddrn locating and catching equipment and with factory
ships that would process, freeze, and store the fish at sea. On the other
hand, after World War II many newly independent nations emerged,
possessing considerable sea coasts and largely undeveloped offshore fish-
eries. As a rule, they did not possess the means for distant fishing and
were concerned with the protection of whatever resources they could
exploit near their own coasts, just at the time when the livelihood of local
fishermen in parts of the world previously ignored as profitable fishing
grounds began to be threatened by the aggressive, wide-ranging fleets of
the distant fishing powers. There was a conflict between their interests
and the interests of the distant fishing powers who were anxious to pre-
serve the freedom of high seas fisheries.
The seriousness of the conflict is underscored by the fact that coastal
waters, by and large, contain the best fisheries, or are the breeding
grounds for rich fishery resources. 19 The relatively shallow waters of
14. 43 Stat. 1841 (1923); 47 Stat. 1872 (1930); 50 Stat. 1351 (1937); [1954] 1
U.S.T. & O.I.A. 5, T.I.A.S. No. 2900.
15. 115 L.N.T.S. 93 (1929).
16. 50 Stat. 1355 (1937). This was the successful culmination of efforts going back
to 1908.
17. Johnston, op. cit. supra note 12, at 360 n.9, citing Tomasevich, International Agree-
ments on the Conservation of Marine Resuorces 271-73 (1943).
18. Food and Agriculture Organization, Yearbook of Fishery Statistics (1964).
19. See Christy & Scott, op. cit. supra note 7, figs. 10 & 11, at 62-63; Laevastu, Natural
Bases of Fisheries in the Atlantic Ocean, figs. 2, 4 & 8, in Atlantic Ocean Fisheries 23, 27,
35 (Borgstrom & Heighway eds. 1961).
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the continental shelves support a wealth of organisms on which fish feed
and these organisms thrive on the nutrient salts and organic matter
washed off the land by rivers and streams. Generally speaking, the coastal
waters in most parts of the world are more fertile than those of the mid-
oceans, though there are marked differences between sectors of coast.20
This has very important implications for the exploitation of the re-
source. Free-swimming marine fishes can be broadly divided into three
types, according to habitat: anadromous, such as salmon, which are
spawned in fresh water and return to their native rivers and streams for
spawning; pelagic, living in the upper layers of the water, whether in
the open ocean or close to shore; and demersal, spending most of their
adult lives near the bottom and within the limits of the continental shelf.2-
The last type, also known as ground fish and bottom fish, are obviously
of major concern to local fishermen. Though demersal fish do migrate
for long distances, they are a more stable and accessible resource than
the pelagic species. Demersal and pelagic fish can be, and are, taken
with the same type of gear, but basically the former are scooped up in
trawls drawn across the ocean bottom, whereas the latter are caught with
lines or seines (nets that enclose a school of fish on the surface). If
trawls are used intensively and indiscriminately, a fishing ground could
be seriously depleted of even immature fish.
In the open ocean fishermen compete on a more or less equal footing
in terms of equipment and pursue the fish wherever they are to be found,
whereas the coastal fisherman is often at a serious disadvantage vis-i-vis
the well-organized fleets from other countries that appear on grounds
he has traditionally fished. Because he is land-based, his vessel is usually
smaller and his equipment less modern. Moreover, he may be restricted
by local conservation measures that do not apply to the foreign fisher-
man. The effect of vigorous competition in coastal waters can be clearly
seen in what happened to the hake off the Oregon and Washington
coasts in 1966. The United States Bureau of Commercial Fisheries had
encouraged the development of a local hake fishery, and confidently
predicted that the annual catch would be in the neighborhood of 200
million pounds. That prediction was realized in 1966, but less than four
million pounds had been taken by local fishermen when the season
closed. All the rest was in Soviet nets. -2 As an expert reported to the
Senate Subcommittee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries in May 1966:
20. Christy & Scott, op. cit. supra note 7, at 61. See Table I for a comparison of con-
tinental shelves around the Atlantic Ocean in terms of area and productivity of living
organisms.
21. Christy & Scott, op. cit. supra note 7, at 75.
22. 64 Pacific Fisherman, Nov. 1966, p. 16.
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TABLE I
CONTINENTAL SHELVES IN THE ATLANTIC OCEAN BY CONTINENT, AREA, AND PRODUCTIVITY*
Area
(in thousands of
square kilometers) Productivity
Africa
Guinean 210 medium-low
St. Helena 140 high
Europe
North Sea 570 high
Barents Sea 550 medium
Baltic 390 medium
Irish Sea 380 medium
Iceland-Faeroes 120 high
Norwegian 120 high
English Channel 90 high-medium
Bay of Biscay 80 medium
West Pyreneian 50 medium
North America
Florida-Texas 450 low
Newfoundland 400 high
Nova Scotia 370 high
Labrador 160 medium
Bahamas 130 low
Carolina 120 medium
New England 100 high
South America
Patagonian 1,000 high
Amazonian 540 low
South Brazilian 400 medium-low
Venezuelan 130 medium
* Based upon information compiled from Laevastu, Natural Bases of Fisheries In the
Atlantic Ocean, fig. 2, in Atlantic Ocean Fisheries 23 (Borgstrom & Heighway eds. 1961).
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These [large trawler] fleets might not be a low cost operation, but they are mobile
and can easily fish one year in the Bering Sea and the next year outside South Africa.
Thus if a ground has been over-fished the fleet can move to another area. The land-
based fleet cannot move but is dependent on the fishing outside the coast. If restric-
tions for purpose of conservation are implemented, such as catch quotas, closed
season, closed areas, etc., this will primarily hurt the local fishing fleet. The ocean-
going trawlers and factory ships can fish elsewhere during the closed season, the
land-based fleet cannot. Therefore, it should be recognized that the local fishermen
have much more at stake in the fishing grounds outside their coast.2
This type of situation brought about another attempt to establish a
principle for sharing the resources of the oceans and, while salvaging
as much as possible of the traditional freedom of fishing on the high
seas, of satisfying the coastal states. -4 A new formula was propounded by
the United States, itself both a distant fishing power and a coastal state,
in the Truman Proclamation of 1945, -5 which asserted the right of the
United States to establish conservation zones unilaterally in areas of the
high seas contiguous to its coasts in which its nationals alone fished and
by agreement if nationals of other countries also fished in such areas. At
the same time, the United States, by this proclamation, conceded a similar
right to other coastal states. No conservation zones were in fact estab-
lished by the United States under the terms of the Truman Proclama-
tion, 6 but it did have an influence on the drawing up of the 1958 Con-
vention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the
Sea. 7
Article I of the Convention reiterates the rights of all nations to en-
gage in fishing on the seas, subject to the interest and rights of coastal
states as provided in the Convention and to the provisions contained
in the articles concerning conservation of the living resources of the
high seas. The rights of the coastal state are spelled out in articles 6 and 7.
They include the right of the coastal state to a voice in any conservation
measures in areas of the high seas adjacent to the coastal state's terri-
torial waters and the right to impose conservation measures in these
areas unilaterally if agreement with other states fishing there cannot
be reached within six months. These measures are binding unless dis-
23. Hearings on S. 2218, op. it. supra note 1, at 176.
24. The term "coastal state" has come through widespread use to mean a state with a
primary interest in fisheries close to its own shores, as opposed to so-called "distant fishing
states" whose vessels operate primarily away from their own shores.
25. Proclamation of Sept. 28, 1945, 59 Stat. 885-86.
26. See Letter From .Assistant Secretary of State MacArthur to Senator Wayne forsc,
May 9, 1966, in 112 Cong. Rec. 10169-70 (daily ed. May 16, 1966).
27. United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Convention on Fishing and
Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, U.N. Doc. No. A/Conf. 13/38, at
139 (U.N. Pub. Sales No. 1958 VA, II) (1958).
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allowed by the special commission provided for in article 9 of the Con-
vention concerning settlement of disputes.
As often happens with efforts at compromise, the Convention appears
not to have succeeded in satisfying the opposing interests. Some of the
distant fishing nations believe that the freedom of the sea has been too
much curtailed in favor of the coastal states. This was shown, for ex-
ample, in an official statement in 1963 as to why Belgium had not signed
the Convention, in which the Belgian Foreign Minister declared that it
would be futile and even dangerous for his country to permit itself to
be bound by such provisions, since no agreement had been reached at
the 1958 Geneva Conference on the precise limit of the territorial sea
and since any extension of fishing jurisdiction beyond the traditional
three miles would be a serious blow to his country's fishing industry.28
On the other hand, the coastal states cannot, under the Convention,
exclude foreign fishermen altogether, and may impose conservation
measures only after having proved that these are urgent and after having
conducted scientific surveys9.2  This may be an expensive and difficult
proposition. Even such an advanced fishing nation as the United States
has not yet begun a thorough scientific evaluation of its fisheries in ac-
cordance with the terms of the Convention.
Despite the apparent timeliness of the proposition that a coastal state
has a special interest in the maintenance of the productivity of the living
resources of the high seas off its shores, the Convention has taken almost
eight years to come into force and was the last of the four Geneva Con-
ventions on the Law of the Sea to do so.3° Of the thirty-seven original
signatories among the eighty-six states represented at the 1958 Confer-
ence, only eleven had ratified the Convention by the spring of 1966. 81
Out of the eleven other states bound by the Convention at the time when
it came into force, eight were not represented at the 1958 Conference.0 2
Meanwhile, parallel with these attempts at compromise, and because
28. R~ponse du Ministre des Affaires Etrang~res & MM Dehousse, Lilar, et Rolin sur
Question No. 29 du 6 mars 1963, in 1 Rev. Beige de Droit International 217-18 (1965).
It must be noted, however, that in the following year Belgium was a signatory to the
European Fisheries Convention which extended fisheries jurisdiction to twelve mitles. 58
Am. J. Int'l L. 1068, 1070-75 (1964).
29. Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas,
op. cit. supra note 27, at art. 7.
30. The Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High
Seas, April 29, 1958, T.I.A.S. No. 5969 (effective March 20, 1966).
31. Australia, Colombia, Haiti, Portugal, United Kingdom, United States, and Venezuela
ratified it, United Nations, Status of Multilateral Conventions (ST/Leg/3, Rev. 1), as did
the Dominican Republic, 51 State Dep't Bull. 530 (1964), Finland, 52 id. 477 (1965), the
Netherlands, 54 id. 592 (1966), and Yugoslavia, 54 id. 549 (1966).
32. The eight states not represented at the 1958 Conference were Jamaica, Madagascar,
Malawi, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Uganda, and Upper Volta. For a complete list of
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of their shortcomings, a third, much more radical and one-sided formula
had begun to emerge: namely, the incorporation of coastal fisheries as
much as possible under the exclusive jurisdiction of the coastal state,
either through extension of the territorial sea or through the creation of
special fishery zones. Its acceptance was made easier because the three-
mile width of the territorial sea was never universally acknowledged,
and because the establishment of contiguous zones extending into the
high seas was a familiar practice of states. Both the United States and
Great Britain had established protective zones of varying width for cus-
toms purposes since the end of the eighteenth century, and the validity
of such practice was upheld long ago by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in
Church v. Hubbart,33 a case concerned with an insurance claim, the
enforcement of which hinged on the validity of the Portuguese seizure
of an American vessel outside the territorial waters of Brazil, then a
Portuguese possession. Holding the seizure to be valid, the Chief Justice
said:
a nation has a right to prohibit any commerce with its colonies. Any attempt to
violate the laws made to protect this right, is an injury to itself, which it may pre-
vent, and it has a right to use the means necessary for its prevention. These means
do not appear to be limited within any certain marked boundaries, which remain the
same, at all times and in all situations. If they are such as unnecessarily to vex and
harass foreign lawful commerce, foreign nations will resist their exercise. If they are
such as are reasonable and necessary to secure their laws from violation, they will
be submitted to.34
Besides customs control, states have also imposed sanitary, fiscal, and
health regulations and security measures.3" Nearly 40 years ago the con-
cept of zones for such purposes was advanced, preparatory to the Hague
Conference, by the American Institute of International Law,3" by the
Institut de Droit International,37 and by the Harvard Research Draft on
the Law of Territorial Waters, which, in the comment on article 20, refers
to "the long-established practice of many states.""8 The 1958 Geneva
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone permitted
the coastal state to impose customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary regu-
delegations at the Conference see United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, supra
note 27, vol. 11, at miii-xxvi.
33. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187 (1804).
34. Id. at 235.
35. Dickinson, Jurisdiction at the Maritime Frontier, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1926).
36. American Institute of International Law, Project No. 12, art. 12, 20 Am. J. Int'l L.
(Supp. 1926, at 323-24).
37. Art. 12 of the Project, La Mer Territoriale en Temps de Paix, drafted at the 1928
Stockholm meeting, added fishing to the list of interests that a state was entitled to take
measures to protect. 34 Annuaire de l'Institut de Droit International 736 (1928).
38. Harvard Research Draft on the Law of Territorial Waters, 23 Am. J. Int'l L.
(Supp. 1929, at 243, 334).
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lations, but did not include security measures."9 The practice of states
indicates that the list of interests that can be protected by a zone is not
constant, but depends on generally acknowledged importance and reason-
ableness, and it does not seem to matter whether the locus of the interests
to be protected is on the land and territorial sea, or on the high seas.40
In the case of the territorial sea, it could be argued with some authority
that no numerically expressed width has become a principle of customary
international law, and that any width that is reasonable and warranted
by the circumstances of the case would not be contrary to this law. Such
was the view of Judge Alvarez in his concurring opinion in the Anglo-
Norwegian Fisheries Case in 1951. 41 The International Court of Justice
itself, on that occasion, did not deal with the width of the territorial sea,
but with its measurement from baselines, permitting the use of specific
rules in cases warranted by special circumstances. Its judgment directly
influenced Iceland's decision to institute the straight baseline system
around its coasts,42 and, somewhat later, the similar but much more
extensive claims of Indonesia and the Philippines.48 The straight base-
line system, by pushing seaward the baseline from which the territorial
sea is measured, places a much larger extent of sea under the state's ex-
clusive jurisdiction.
By the time the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
was called in 1958, therefore, a trend toward extension of the territorial
sea beyond three miles was firmly established, particularly among coun-
tries such as Iceland and some of the Latin American states (Peru, Chile,
Ecuador) which had valuable fisheries off their shores and sought a wider
territorial sea to secure exclusive rights in at least part of those fisheries.
Most of the maritime and distant fishing powers represented at the Con-
ference, on the other hand, strove, both for strategic and economic rea-
sons, to preserve as narrow a belt of territorial sea as possible.
In order to reach a compromise which would preserve a narrow ter-
39. U.N. Doc. No. A./Conf. 13/L. 52, art. 24.
40. See McDougal & Burke, The Public Order of the Oceans 606-07 (1962). See also
Hydeman & Berman, International Control of Nuclear Maritime Activities 226-40 (1960);
see generally McDougal & Burke, op. cit. supra at 565-729.
41. Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, [1951] I.C.J. Rep. 116, 145. See also Teclaff,
Shrinking the High Seas by Technical Methods-From the 1930 Hague Conference to the
1958 Geneva Conference, 39 U. Det. L.J. 660 (1962). Alvarez stated that having regard
to the great variety of geographical and economic conditions of states, it was not possible
to lay down uniform rules governing the extent of the territorial sea applicable to all
states. The state could do this itself, provided it were done in a reasonable manner and
with justification therefor. Alvarez' view was to a large extent based on, and subsequently
gave great support to, the practice of the Latin American countries.
42. Kobayashi, The Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case of 1951 and the Changing Law
of the Territorial Sea 40-43 (U. Fla. Monograph No. 26, 1965).
43. Id. at 45-46.
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ritorial sea and at the same time satisfy the coastal states, the United
States proposed a three-mile territorial sea with a twelve-mile fishery
zone, measured from the baseline, in which zone other states would
retain their fishing rights if they had 'fished there for at least ten years."
In view of the fact, however, that most states had already gone beyond
three miles in their approach to the problem of the territorial sea, the
United States tendered another proposal, for a six-mile territorial sea
with no change in the fishery zone. Canada went further and proposed
a six-mile territorial sea, plus a six-mile exclusive fishing zone without
any rights for other states.46 The upshot was that no proposal secured
the necessary two-thirds majority, and the whole problem was left in
abeyance.
It was taken up two years later at the 1960 Conference, and the signif-
icant feature at this time was the shift in the position of the maritime
powers, especially those of Europe. The United States-Canadian pro-
posal for a six-mile territorial sea and a six-mile fishing zone,47 amended
by Brazil, Cuba and Uruguay to be more favorable to the coastal states, 48
almost carried the day. It failed by only one vote.4 ' The Brazil-Cuba-
Uruguay amendment would have enabled the coastal state to claim pref-
erential fishing rights in the high seas beyond its fishing zone when it
was "scientifically established that a special situation or condition makes
the exploitation of the living resources of the high seas in that area of
fundamental importance to the economic development of the coastal
State or the feeding of its population.2*0 It is significant that this
proposal, when put separately to a vote, was adopted 58:19:10, in a
rare display of agreement in which all the western European nations,
Canada, the United States, almost all the Latin American countries, and
several Asian and African ones concurred. 51
The 1960 Conference showed that the principle of exclusive fishing
rights within a zone up to twelve miles had been accepted by the majority
of states, including the most important maritime powers, though with
stress on historic rights in the case of the latter. It also accelerated the
44. U.N. Doc. No. A/Conf. 13/C.1/L. 140 (1958).
45. U.N. Doc. No. A/Conf. 13/C.1/L. 159/Rev. 2 (1958).
46. U.N. Doc. No. A/Conf. 13/C.1/L. 77/Rev. 3 (1958).
47. U.N. Doc. No. A/Conf 19/C.11/L. 10 (1960).
48. U.N. Doc. No. A/Conf. 19/L. 12 (1960).
49. France, for example, voted in favor of the proposal, although, as her delegate Andr6
Gros made clear, its acceptance involved "immense sacrifices." United Nations Second
Conference on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. No. A/Conf. 19/8, at 24-25 (U.N. Pub. Sales
No. 1960 V.4, HI) (1960). Other European and primarily distant fishing powers voting for
it included Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom.
50. U.N. Doc. No. A/Conf. 19/L. 12, para. 6 (1960).
51. United Nations Second Conference on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. No. A/Conf.
19/8, at 30 (U.N. Pub. Sales No. 1960 V.4, 1) (1960).
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establishment, by unilateral action of individual states and by multi-
lateral regional convention, of fishing zones extending out to twelve miles.
Its effect was immediately noticeable, for instance, in the fisheries agree-
ment between Great Britain and Norway of November 17, 1960, whereby
Great Britain recognized Norway's jurisdiction over a twelve-mile fishery
zone, but was permitted to fish in the outer six miles until October 1970.12
The preamble to that treaty specifically refers to the United States-
Canadian six-plus-six proposal at the Conference.53
By mid-summer 1966, 49 nations with sea coasts had established a
twelve-mile limit, among them eleven African states which had become
independent since World War II." Regional extension of fishery juris-
diction to the twelve-mile limit was achieved by the convention adopted
at the 1964 European Fisheries Conference in London. Through the
signatories to this convention, including such long-established maritime
powers as the United Kingdom, a girdle of exclusive or restricted rights
was thrown around most of western and northwestern Europe."
The United States continued to hold to the three-mile limit. A State
Department letter of July 13, 1962, declared unequivocally that "it must
be concluded that in the present state of international law, there is no
valid basis for the assertion by a coastal State of a twelve-mile exclusive
fisheries zone."56 Within four years, however, the situation had changed
so radically that on May 18, 1966, Douglas MacArthur II, Assistant
Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, wrote to Senator Warren
G. Magnuson: "In view of the recent developments in international
practice, action by the United States at this time to establish an exclusive
fisheries zone extending 9 miles beyond the territorial sea would not be
contrary to international law."57 Even as the United States was formally
extending its fishery jurisdiction out to twelve miles in the following
52. Cmd. No. 1352 (T.S. No. 25 of 1961), reproduced in 57 Am. J. Int'l L. 490 (1963).
53. "Taking into account the proposal on the breadth of the territorial sea and fishery
limits which was put forward jointly by the Governments of the United States of America
and Canada at the Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1960 and
which obtained 54 votes .... " Ibid.
54. 112 Cong. Rec. 12974 (daily ed. June 20, 1966). These figures are based on U.S.
Department of State information.
55. The text of the Convention can be found in 58 Am. J. Int'l L. 1068, 1070-74 (1964).
For a list of signatories and parties to the Convention (according to information available
to the Department of State as of May 15, 1966) see 1966 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
4033-34 & nn.1-2.
56. Letter on file in the Office of the Legal Advisor, Department of State, July 13,
1962, reproduced in 57 Am. J. Int'l L. 404 (1963).
57. Letter From Assistant Secretary of State MacArthur to Senator Magnuson, Chairman
of the Senate Commerce Committee, May 18, 1966, in S. Rep. No. 1280, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. 12 (1966).
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October, Japan, the diehard opponent of coastal states' rights, was re-
ported to be considering a similar exclusive fishing zone around its ter-
ritory' s The pressures for such action came, as in the United States,
from local fishing interests threatened by the activities of foreign, chiefly
Soviet and Korean, fishing boats. A Japanese fisheries spokesman stated
in justification that "extension of administrative authority over wider
waters is an internationally accepted custom today, a demand of the
times.", 9
The twelve-mile fishery zone appears to have the support of the ma-
jority of states, and, if all the countries which now claim it had voted for
the Canadian proposal for such a zone at the 1958 Geneva Conference,
it would have passed then. 0 Claims to wider jurisdiction have been
resisted and therefore can hardly be considered as an accepted general
principle or an acquired right. Once established on a broad regional or
continental basis, however, they may be difficult to disregard or even
modify. As of mid-summer 1966, some fifteen nations claimed jurisdic-
tions of 100 miles or more.6' Such extensive claims lend substance to
the view that the twelve-mile fishing zone, even if coupled with preferen-
tial rights for coastal states beyond that limit, may not be the final
answer to the problem of conservation and exploitation of the resources
of the seas. It may be nothing more than a temporary compromise, and,
from the point of view of the interests of the coastal state, the ultimate
acceptable jurisdiction may be nothing less than the control of all off-
shore fisheries.
The twelve-mile zone is, after all, a very arbitrary limit; it may give
adequate protection to fishery resources in some instances and be wholly
inadequate in others. With reference to the United States, for example,
an expert presenting his opinion to the Senate Subcommittee on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries in May 1966 stated:
58. 64 Pacific Fisherman, Oct. 1966, p. 6.
59. Ibid.
60. The fishing zone was proposed by Canada as an alternative to the twelve-mile
territorial sea, and was envisaged as a contiguous zone, with the modification that within
it the coastal state should have the exclusive right of regulation and control of fishing.
See Gotlieb, The Canadian Contribution to the Concept of a Fishing Zone in International
Law, 2 Canadian Yearbook of International Law 55, 64-65 (1964). The text of Canada's
proposal is contained in U.N. Doc. No. A/Conf. 13/C.I/L. 77/Rev. 3 (1958), and it pro-
vides: "A State has a fishing zone contiguous to its territorial sea extending to a limit
twelve nautical miles from the baseline from which the breadth of its territorial sea is
measured in which it has the same rights in respect of fishing and the exploitation of
the living resources of the sea as it has in its territorial sea."
61. See the table in 112 Cong. Rec. 12974 (daily ed. June 20, 1966), which was com-
piled from information supplied by the Department of State, as of June 1, 1966.
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I question the use of mileage as a basis for a fisheries limit in areas where ground
fish predominate. . . The depth of the ocean ...seems . . . to be a more logical
basis for a fisheries limit than the distance from the shoreline. A 200 meter isobath
could be a logical fisheries limit. On the East Coast of the United States the distance
from land would then range from about 10 miles outside Miami to about 170 miles
on the George's Bank and in the Gulf. On the Pacific Coast this isobath runs between
3 and 40 miles off shore, but the whole Bering Sea would be included. Here the median
between the U.S. and Russian territory could be used. On the map one can visualize
what this fisheries limit would mean in New England. 2
While it is true, generally speaking, that coastal waters are more pro-
ductive than those of the mid-ocean, their productivity varies enormously
even for individual species within a relatively small area, depending on
depth and temperature of the water, nature of bottom sediments, and
the amount and type of organisms on which the fish feed, as well as other
factors.63 Marine ecology has not yet arrived at the stage where the dis-
tribution of the living resources of the sea can be described, analyzed,
and predicted with accuracy, although considerable progress is being
made toward this end through surveys sponsored by international bodies
such as UNESCO, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the General
Fisheries Council for the Mediterranean, the Western Africa Fisheries
Commission, the International Commission for North Atlantic Fisheries,
and works such as the American Geographical Society's Serial Atlas of
the Marine Environment.
6 4
A more flexible criterion than the twelve-mile limit for the extent of
the coastal state's control has been claimed in so-called geographical
reality. This was the underlying principle of the judgment in the Anglo-
Norwegian Fisheries Case, in which the International Court of Justice
emphasized that "it is the land which confers upon the coastal State a
right to the waters off its coasts." 5 It was given an even more liberal in-
terpretation in the concurring opinion of Judge Alvarez, 0 which influ-
enced a number of Latin American states to establish territorial seas
or fishery zones as wide as 200 miles. The Declaration of Santiago,
62. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries of the Senate
Committee on Commerce, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 65, at 175 (1966) (opinion of Professor
Andreas A. Holmsen of the University of Rhode Island).
63. The silver hake, for example, a common and widely distributed ground fish In
Atlantic waters off the New England coast, is found in varying concentrations at depths
ranging between 70 and 210 meters and in water temperatures ranging from 60 to 120 Centi-
grade. American Geographical Society, Serial Atlas of the Marine Environment, Folio 10:
Autumn Distribution of Groundfish Species in the Gulf of Maine and Adjacent Waters,
1955-61 (1965).
64. American Geographical Society, supra note 63, Folio 4: Regional Fisheries Ocean-
ographic Synopses (1963).
65. Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, [19511 I.CJ. Rep. 116, 133.
66. Id. at 150-51.
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adopted by Chile, Ecuador, and Peru in 1952, states that "the geological
and biological factors affecting the existence, conservation and develop-
ment of the marine fauna and flora of the waters adjacent to the coasts of
the declarant countries.. ." had rendered the former extent of territorial
sea and contiguous zone, "insufficient to permit of the conservation, de-
velopment and use of those resources, to which the coastal countries are
entitled.167 The basis of these countries' claims to such an extensive
fishery jurisdiction is the varying distance from the shore to the Hum-
boldt Current, which ranges between 100 and 200 miles out to sea.s
The court's affirmation of the close relationship between land and
adjacent sea in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case has given support
also to proponents of the continental shelf as a zone of fishery jurisdic-
tion. The idea of the shelf as a fishery zone was put forward at least half
a century ago-for example, by Odon de Buren, later Spanish Director-
General of Fisheries, at a national fishery congress in Madrid in 1916;
by the Argentinian Jos6 Lon Suarez in a series of lectures published in
1918; and by the Portuguese Admiral Almeida D'Eqa in a memorandum
meant for the 7th International Fishery Congress which was to have
been held in Santander in 1921.69
The Truman Proclamation of 1945 concerning the continental shelf"'
influenced other states to issue similar proclamations, and once it was
accepted that mineral resources could come under a state's exclusive
jurisdiction, provided that this did not unduly interfere with navigation,
it was easy to make the next step and include living resources of the
sea. The 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf did make
this step, but was confined to "sedentary" species, specifically withhold-
ing from the coastal state jurisdiction over the waters above the shelf
outside the territorial sea.7 The definition of "sedentary" species as those
which "at the harvestable stage, either are immobile on or under the
seabed or are unable to move except in constant physical contact with
the seabed or the subsoil,117 2 has not been clarified and has given rise
67. Declaration of the Maritime Zone, U.N. Legislative Series. Laws and Regulations
on the Regime of the Territorial Sea, U.N. Doc. No. ST/Leg./Ser. B/6, treaty No. 20,
at 724 (1957). The agreements between Chile, Ecuador and Peru were signed at the
First Conference on the Exploitation and Conservation of the Maritime Resources of the
South Pacific on August 18, 1952, in San Diego.
68. See Dean, The Second Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Fight for
Freedom of the Seas, 54 Am. J. Int'l L. 751, 755 n.14, citing Peruvian Decree No. 781 of
Aug. 1, 1947, and other sources.
69. See Riesenfeld, Protection of Coastal Fisheries Under International Law 75-76, 116
(1942).
70. Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12303 (1945).
71. U.N. Doc. No. A/Conf. 13/L. 55 (1957).
72. Id. at art. 2(4).
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to considerable dispute, for example in the matter of the king crab of
the United States continental shelf under the Bering Sea7" and the lob-
sters on the continental shelf off Brazil.
74
There would appear to be a strong argument for regarding all fisheries,
both floating and sedentary, as one type of resource, since the distinction
between the more mobile sedentary and the less mobile floating species
is by no means sharp. Evidently a number of states do regard them as
one, for some of the more extensive fishing limits claimed are in effect
claims to the continental shelf as a zone of fishery jurisdiction." Recently
there has been considerable demand from fisheries interests in the United
States for an exclusive fisheries zone superadjacent to the continental
shelf, and legislation to that end was introduced in the 89th Congress.70
The shift that has occurred within the past quarter of a century in
the regime of the sea-the widespread separation of territorial waters
from fishery jurisdiction, the steady erosion of the concept that fish are
"free for all"-is a revolt against the situation outlined by the 1953
report of the International Commission to the United Nations General
Assembly:
The seas are in reality dominated, used, and-it may almost be said-possessed by
States maintaining powerful navies, fishing and merchant fleets, bases, supply ports,
docks and shipyards. The nationals of those States are the only persons who fully
enjoy all the privileges of the "freedom of the seas." 77
Not merely have the claims of states with a primary and, for the most
part, exclusive interest in local offshore fisheries begun to take prece-
dence, but most of the distant fishing powers have been forced, for the
protection of their own offshore resources and their own fishermen, to
join the ranks of the coastal states. If this trend continues, it is not
improbable that ever-more extensive jurisdictions will be sought, and
exploitation of some of the richest sea fisheries would then be divided
up by a process dependent on geographical accident-hardly an equitable
solution, though better, perhaps, than none at all.
73. See Christy & Scott, The Commonwealth in Ocean Fisheries 171 (1965); see also
64 Pacific Fisherman, Nov. 1966, p. 1.
74. See Azzam, Dispute Between France and Brazil Over Lobster Fishing in the At-
lantic, 13 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 1453 (1964).
75. For example, the hundred-mile jurisdictions claimed by India and Pakistan, see table
in 112 Cong. Rec. 12974 (daily ed. June 20, 1966), correspond approximately to the con-
tinental shelf at its widest around the Indian sub-continent, see 4 Fishing News Int'l, Jan.-
March 1965, pp. 20, 21, 24.
76. H.R. 14961, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). This bill was introduced by Congressman
Pelly on May 10, 1966.
77. 2 U.N. Yearbook of the Int'l Law Comm'n 244, U.N. Doc. No. A/Cn. 4/Ser. A/
1953/add. 1 (1953).
